

INITIATING THE VIEWER: DEIXIS AND VISUAL PERCEPTION IN ALCMAN'S LYRIC DRAMA*

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A lecture by Charles Fillmore on deixis starts with a humorous introduction that includes a series of examples in which uncertainties about the anchoring of various messages in a communication situation causes misunderstanding and confusion on the part of their receivers (Fillmore 1997.59–75, esp. 59–60). Among those hilarious examples, the one closest to Alcman's first *Partheneion* (PMG 1) is the last on Fillmore's list: "The worst possible case I can imagine," Fillmore says, "for a totally unanchored occasion-sentence is that of finding afloat in the ocean a bottle containing a note which reads, 'Meet me here at noon tomorrow with a stick about this big'" (Fillmore 1997.60). This hypothetical case finds its most precise expression in the *Partheneion* attributed to Alcman: the poem, found in a tomb in Egypt, contains—like Fillmore's bottle in the ocean—riddling statements from a first-person speaker who persists in anchoring her poetic message to a communication situation irrevocably inaccessible to us.

The poem, designed to be performed by a chorus of young Spartan maidens, seems to be structured in two parts. The first, mostly damaged part (1–35) includes the narration of a series of mythological events related to local Spartan tradition (Calame 1977.II.52–66 and 1983.313–22); the second part (36–101) is mainly dedicated to the verbal representation of the chorus's performance as that performance is being held. The first and

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second parts were probably connected by thematic links that remain obscure. The second and better preserved part, however, offers a signal case in the study of deixis in archaic poetry and performance. Its uniqueness is due to the fact that it is not just a choral piece to be orally performed in a certain space and time by certain persons; in the process of thematizing the extra-linguistic context of its own performance, these very deictic coordinates are turned into the main subject of its discourse.

Thus the entire second part of the *Partheneion* poses a series of critical questions relating to deixis. In this paper, I concentrate on a specific aspect of the song's deictic function, the one relating to sight.¹ Deixis, the verbal process of pointing towards an extra-linguistic context, is essentially—although not exclusively—a way of referring to sight. Not accidentally, then, the deictic network of the *Partheneion* appears to be particularly dense in the first thirty-seven lines of the section under discussion where sight becomes activated in various ways (36–72). Of course, the chorus's insistence on the act of viewing might have been dictated by the ritual they enact: a significant part of this ritual, supposed by some to venerate Artemis Orthria, is the coming of dawn and sunrise—a phenomenon intrinsically relevant to human sight.² In my reading, however, I examine the complex verbal mechanisms through which optical perception in the *Partheneion* gets fully dramatized for an audience, thus turning the ritual into an essentially theatrical event.

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN DEIXIS AND METAPHOR

ἔστι τις σιῶν τίσις·
 ὁ δ' ὄλβιος, ὅστις εὖφρων
 ἀμέραν [δι]απλέκει
 ἄκλαυτος· ἐγὼν δ' ἀείδω
 40 Ἄγιδῶς τὸ φῶς· ὁρῶ
 ἦ ὥτ' ἄλιον, ὄνπερ ἅμιν
 Ἄγιδὸν μαρτύρεται
 φαίνην· ἐμὲ δ' οὔτ' ἐπαινῆν

1 From v. 78 onward, the chorus's references are mostly related to hearing and not to sight. Other aspects of deixis in relation to Alcman's Louvre *Partheneion* are mentioned in Danielewicz 1990.13 and Clay 1991.63–67.

2 On the problems related to the goddess mentioned in the *Partheneion*, see Lipourlis 1968.380–401, Calame 1977.II.119–28.

- οὔτε μωμήσθαι νιν ἄ κλεννὰ χοραγὸς
 45 οὐδ' ἄμῳς ἐῆι· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἤμεν αὐτά
 ἐκπρεπῆς τῷς ὥπερ αἴτις
 ἐν βοτοῖς στάσειεν ἵππον
 παγὸν ἀεθλοφόρον καναχάποδα
 τῶν ὑποπετριδίων ὀνείρων·
- 50 ἦ οὐχ ὀρήις; ὁ μὲν κέλῃς
 Ἐνετικός· ἅ δὲ χαίτα
 τᾶς ἐμᾶς ἀνεψιᾶς
 Ἀγησιχόρας ἐπανθεῖ
 χρυσὸς [ὦ]ς ἀκήρατος·
- 55 τό τ' ἀργύριον πρόσωπον,
 διαφάδαν τί τοι λέγω;
 Ἀγησιχόρα μὲν αὐτά·
 ἅ δὲ δευτέρα πεδ' Ἀγιδὼ τὸ φεῖδος
 ἵππος Ἰβηνῶι Κολαξαῖος δραμήται
- 60 ταὶ Πεληάδες γὰρ ἅμιν
 ὀρθραῖα φᾶρος φεροίσαις
 νύκτα δι' ἀμβροσίαν ἄτε σήριον
 ἄστρον ἀνηρομέναι μάχονται·
- οὔτε γάρ τι πορφύρας
 65 τόσσοις κόροις ὥστ' ἀμύναι,
 οὔτε ποικίλος δράκων
 παγχρύσιος, οὐδὲ μίτρα
 Λυδία, νεανίδων
 ἱανογ[λ]εφάρων ἄγαλμα,
- 70 οὐδὲ ταὶ Ναννῶς κόμαι,
 ἀλλ' οὐ[δ]' Ἀρέτα σιειδῆς,
 οὐδὲ Σύλακίς τε καὶ Κλησισίηρα . . .

There is such a thing as the vengeance of the gods:
 that one is blessed who devoutly
 weaves to the end the web of his day
 unweeping. And so I sing
 of the light of Agido: I see her
 like the sun, which Agido summons to shine on us
 as our witness; but our illustrious choir leader
 by no means allows me

either to praise or to blame her; for she herself
 looks pre-eminent, just as if one
 were to set a horse among grazing herds,
 a sturdy, thunderous-hoofed prize winner,
 one of those seen in winged dreams.

Don't you see? This race horse
 is Enetic; but the hair
 of my cousin
 Hagesichora has the bloom
 of undefiled gold.
 And that silver face of hers!
 But why am I talking to you with full clarity?
 Here she is: Hagesichora!
 And the second in beauty, Agido,
 will run like a Colaxaeon horse next to an Ibenian;
 for these doves are fighting for us
 who are bringing our sacred offering to Orthria,
 in the ambrosial night, rising up like the star Sirius.

For, to reciprocate, the abundance of purple
 is not sufficient,
 nor is the intricate snake
 of solid gold, nor the Lydian headband,
 a delight for dark-eyed girls,
 nor Nanno's hair,
 not even the godlike Areta,
 nor Thylakis and Cleësithera . . .³

From the outset of the second part of the *Partheneion* (39–43), it is clear that the chorus is singing while the two ritual agents—Hagesichora, the chorus leader, and Agido, probably her assistant—are located at some distance and absorbed in their own ritual and performative action (Calame 1983.312–13). The first two statements of the chorus, ἐγὼν δ' αἰείδω /

3 The translation I offer here is a hybrid. It largely reproduces Campbell's translation (1988.365–67), but to comply with the editor's wish, it is set as verse. The most crucial modifications rely on Calame's 1983.270 understanding of the poem, which I essentially follow throughout my reading. In accordance with my interpretation of the deictic network of the poem, the translation emphasizes certain deictic expressions.

Ἀγιδῶς τὸ φῶς· ὁρῶ / φῶτ' ἄλιον, ὄνπερ ἄμιν / Ἀγιδὸν μαρτύρεται / φαίνην, are emblematic. The first person introduces herself as performing the role of a collective speaker/singer, while anchoring her speech in the *hic et nunc* of the ritual as an eyewitness. Yet, despite their apparently referential and descriptive character, both statements are, in fact, essentially imaginary. In the former, what the collective speaker says she is singing about is not Agido herself but the *light* she radiates, while in the latter, although the verb ὁρῶ denotes plain sight, the speaker clearly shifts from the actual subject of her sight, Agido, to a virtual spectacle constructed through a figure of speech: what I see, says the speaking chorus, is Agido *like* the sun. Therefore, through the chorus's sight, Agido is first dematerialized into light and then turned by a simile into the sun, the sun that Agido herself, in her identity as a ritual agent, is summoning to appear.⁴

The next statement presents the illustrious choregos (Hagesichora) as not permitting the speaker to praise or blame, because she herself looks so pre-eminent (43–45).⁵ The verb that denotes her salient appearance, δοκεῖ (45), implies sight, in that it names the optical impression that the object of sight (Hagesichora) gives to its beholders (the singing chorus). Yet, in a way that resembles the presentation of Agido in the preceding lines, Hagesichora is described not as she actually looks but as she is imaginatively envisioned (45–49). This time the metaphoric imagery enhances vision by placing it in the world of dreams: the new simile sets the chorus leader within a hypothetical scenery that belongs to the “fleeting” or “rock-sheltered” dreams (τῶν ὑποπετρίδιων ὀνείρων, 49), while her pre-eminence is imagined as that of a “sturdy thundering steed, a champion.” The reference to dreams

4 Several scholars have attempted to interpret these lines either in a religious context, where the light radiating from Agido's face would have a ritual significance, or in terms of actual reality, where this light is understood as coming from a torch that Agido is perhaps holding. See, for instance, Puelma 1977, esp. 13–15, Clay 1991.54–57. While neither of these approaches can be excluded, it is important to note not only that the light imagery is essentially metaphoric here, but also that the unceasing flow of metaphors following this first one will transform Agido into a series of different figures whose function escapes such interpretive logic. See also Segal 1998.38 n. 17.

5 Others interpret Agido as the subject of the verb δοκεῖ. For Hagesichora as subject, see Calame 1977.II.47–48 and n. 3. The difficult problems related to the attribution of a series of acts to either Hagesichora or to Agido is due to the fact that most deictics referring to them have mainly gestural and not symbolic value. In other words, they were probably meant to be accompanied by actual choreographed gestures. On this, see also Clark 1996.157.

within the chorus's simile will prove to be crucial. At the moment, however, it is worth following the chorus's unfolding speech step by step.

Although vision has been transferred to the world of dreams by the end of line 49, the reuse of the verb ὀρᾶν (50) in the very beginning of the following stanza seems to reinstate pure sight, while also empowering the deictic field of the chorus's utterance. Moreover, the shifting of grammatical person from first-person singular (ὁρῶ, 40) to second-person singular (ὀρήϊς, 50) enhances the deictic anchoring by adding a second-person addressee intended to share with the speaker the same spectacle on the same spatio-temporal level. At this point, a twofold question can be raised: What is the identity of this second person? Who is this second person in the broader frame of the performance?

Given the fact that only choreographed gesture would definitely reveal the intended addressee, absolute certainty about the identification of the second person is impossible. Yet, throughout the song, grammatical persons seem to be assigned to different participants in its performance. The first person is used by the collective speaker in order to refer to her own functions, while the third person mainly refers to the performative actions of the two ritual agents. The second person is probably used, then, to address the third element of the performance, namely its audience. Even if we imagine, as has repeatedly been suggested, that the second-person addressee is the chorus itself, then the chorus is enacting the role of an internal audience as a model upon which the external audience, that is, the actual one, has to be molded. At any rate, the chorus's unremitting interest in directing the eye toward the ritual agents with a dense network of deictic expressions implies that there is an ulterior and natural receiver of all these persistent acts of demonstration, a viewing audience, which is thus an indispensable factor in the performance.⁶

6 Three different approaches have been suggested concerning this issue: a) the chorus uses the second person in order to refer to themselves—see, for instance, Calame 1983.327 and Page 1951.58 n. 4; b) the chorus, while referring to Hagesichora's appearance, addresses Agido—Gentili 1988.74; c) the chorus addresses the audience—Puelma 1977.42 n. 77, also Clark 1996.157. In most of these readings, however, the function of the second-person addressee is of marginal interest, while in our reading, with its focus on the song's deictic structure, this issue is central. Certainly, it is through staging that the function of these expressions would be illuminated. For instance, if the questions in v. 50 (ἦ οὐχ ὀρήϊς) and v. 56 (διαφάδαν τί τοι λέγω) are addressed *by* the chorus *to* the chorus—as in suggestion a), we can imagine some of its members uttering them while the rest would remain silent in the role of an internal audience. Similarly, if the song was sung by two half-choruses

As for the second question, the *opinio communis* holds that the chorus, after comparing their choregos to a horse of dreams, uses the phrase ἦ οὐχ ὀρῆις in order to return to reality.⁷ Yet a closer reading of the lines that follow shows that the visual awakening of the second person is, in fact, meant to operate just like the first-person's vision. In other words, the first person invites the addressee not to "see" *what is really present* but instead, while looking at what *is* present, to imaginatively transform the actually visible agents and their actions into a virtual and imaginary spectacle.

The demonstrative force of ὁ μὲν (50), which comes immediately after the second-person's exhortation to behold, is, in fact, another catalyst for imaginative visualization: while directing sight toward the actual agent, it artfully sustains and expands the metaphoric imagery with which the previous stanza ended.⁸ While probably referring to Agido, ὁ μὲν points her out as an Enetic race horse; similarly, ἃ δὲ χαίτα (51), presumably directed towards Hagesichora's hair, transforms it, through a remarkable combination of three distinct fields of metaphor, into a horse's mane as well as a blossom of pure gold. In the next line, τό (55) focuses on her face, now described as silvery. A second wave of intensely deictic signs follows: the question διαφάδαν τί τοι λέγω (literally: "Why do I talk to you with full

(Rosenmeyer 1966.322–25 and 337–39), one half-chorus would probably address the other in the second person. In both cases, the members of the chorus acting as listeners would essentially function as the internal projection and model of the external audience. The mise en scène of the performance—requiring the two ritual agents, Hagesichora and Agido, to be absorbed in their mutual ritual task and located at some distance from the chorus—is unlikely to let us visualize Agido as attentively listening to the chorus's questions regarding Hagesichora's looks. Puelma's brief note (c, above) is then more appealing, for two additional reasons: first, in the second *Partheneion* by Alcman, the audience, called στρατός, is explicitly part of its mise en scène (Calame 1983.414)—one more indication that the audience probably played an active role in the choreographer's conception. In addition, the second-person address, often directed to a named receiver representing the audience, is a typical lyric strategy underlining the presence of the speaker's receiver, and thus further anchoring the poetic utterance in the *hic et nunc*.

7 See, for instance, Calame 1983.327 and a similar interpretation in Pavese 1992.61.

8 According to Calame 1983.328, ὁ μὲν is an article and not a demonstrative pronoun. For an opposing view, see Puelma 1977.28 n. 55. Even as an article, ὁ μὲν may be thought to preserve a demonstrative force, further enhanced by the references in the chorus's speech to the actual space of the ritual along with its actual agents. The constant reference to the three-dimensional space is likely to reinforce the demonstrative value of such expressions. A similar approach may apply to τό (v. 55); Calame 1983.329 suggests that its possessive value is stronger than its demonstrative. On the demonstrative force of articles, see, for instance, Chantraine 1953.160–62 and Schwyzler 1969.II.20–21, 207–08.

clarity?") forcefully reactivates the deictic field while implying that the chorus's accurate and lucid description can easily be double-checked and confirmed by the spectators as eyewitnesses.⁹ This implication is corroborated in the immediately following Ἀγησιχόρα μὲν αὐτά (57). The statement, with its vivid demonstrative force, enhances the deictic value of the whole utterance: "Ecce Hagesichora!" Yet we know now that this wonderful object of the chorus's *demonstratio ad oculos*, Hagesichora, is, in fact, a construction, a spectrum of constant visual metamorphoses.

Thus in the *Partheneion*, the chorus's report of what they perceive with their eyes acquires an intriguing function. On the one hand, through the repetitive use of verbs of sight, demonstrative pronouns, and articles, the chorus gives the impression of *anchoring* the speech in the field of deixis; at the same time, they show that the very act of being a spectator, of looking at the ritual agents Hagesichora and Agido, becomes meaningful only if the gaze directed at them sees them in a constant flow of imagery. In other words, while the deictic network is apparently dropping the anchor of the utterance into the deictic field that surrounds it, what it *really* does is lift that anchor and lead the mind's eye to sail on the sea of imagination.

Within this process, the objects of the chorus's demonstration, Hagesichora and Agido, are envisioned through two interrelated, yet for the moment still distinguishable, fields. One relates to light, the other to movement. The perception of Agido as pure light, the simile of her as the sun, and the depiction of Hagesichora's hair as pure gold, as well as the silvery radiance from her face belong to the first category, while the similes and metaphors portraying both agents as moving or running horses belong to the second. Moreover, the images that result from either branch of metaphor are never frozen. The Enetic horse (50–51) is turned into a Colaxaeon (59). The horse of dreams (45–49) is eventually transformed into an Ibenian horse running next to the Colaxaeon (59). Thus not only is the real world of the

9 On the rare use of the word διαφάδαν, see Calame 1983.329. Note that in Solon 37.1 W, the word is used in a context where, even metaphorically, sight seems to somehow be involved in the poet's diction and imagery. It is difficult to resist mentioning here the striking similarity between the repeated use of the verbs διέφανε and διεφαίνετο in Theocritus's *Helen's Epithalamium* (vv. 26 and 28) and the διαφάδαν τι τοι λέγω in Alcman (v. 56). The common context of both poems and, even more, the fact that, in both cases, the chorus's description applies to its choregos—Hagesichora in Alcman, Helen in Theocritus—make it likely that it is this very διαφάδαν that the Hellenistic poet noticed when choosing the verb διεφαίνετο twice for his own poem.

chorus's references transmuted into an imaginary one, but this imaginary world is constantly remodeled and reshaped. Such constant transformation also erases the boundaries between the two fields of metaphoric imagery. For instance, Agido, first seen as the sun, is then viewed as a race horse, while Hagesichora, with her horse's mane seen as blossoming like the purest gold, is simultaneously a source of light *and* movement.

The more condensed and intricate the deictic network of the chorus's speech, the more elaborate and enriched its nexus of metaphors. Moreover, the two realms of deixis and metaphor are not simply juxtaposed but so tightly interwoven as to be virtually inseparable. On the basis of these observations, it is now worth re-examining the controversial lines 60–63. My approach supports previous readings according to which the whole passage refers to Hagesichora and Agido rather than to a rival chorus called or described as Πεληάδες. Through a specific focus on deixis and sight, two important aspects of this problematic passage can be illuminated.¹⁰

The four-line sentence starts with a deictic sign: ταί (60). Up to this point, indexicals have been used to point toward either Hagesichora or Agido. Not accidentally, this is the first time that a deictic sign is used in the plural. It would be strange, then, to interpret this indexical as suddenly introducing a new group of persons, not already mentioned. On the contrary, as the song develops, τὰ Πεληάδες anaphorically refers to the immediately previous statements in the poem's discourse regarding Hagesichora and Agido, while, at the same time, it points exophorically, perhaps with choreographed postures and gestures, toward them. In other words, the feminine plural ταί seems to gain an endophoric, discursive meaning and yet to maintain an exophoric one.

Τὰ Πεληάδες initiates, then, a climax where, in a remarkable chain of three successive metaphors, Hagesichora and Agido are seen as an inseparable couple at the same time that movement and speed become entirely transformed into light. Just as the description of the two ritual agents began with the description of Agido as an impression of light and brightness, so, too, does it end. Only now the two agents together, as a unified whole, are envisioned as the single but brightest star, Sirius.

10 Any broader discussion of these problems exceeds my present purposes. On these issues, see Calame 1977.II.72 n. 52 for argumentation and bibliography, also Calame 1983.313 and 331–32. See Segal 1998.26 and 36 n. 7 for further bibliography on this sharply contested issue. For a more recent view, see Clay 1991.47–67, esp. 58–67.

The final depiction of the two women as the star Sirius will be explained more thoroughly as our reading progresses. For the moment, we may explore the developing stages of their visual transformation. What has not been appreciated so far is that the poetic imagery used by Alcman probably arises from established poetic patterns in the archaic period relevant to horse race imagery. Such imagery, especially from the *Iliad*, can illuminate one of the most disputed problems since the Louvre *Partheneion* was published, namely whether the term Πεληάδες in line 60 should be understood as meaning “doves” or “the constellation of the Pleiades.” The juxtaposition of epic and choral poetry will help us to pinpoint the affinities in diction and imagery between the two types of poems and, eventually, to understand the logic of Alcman’s enigmatic lines. On the other hand, this juxtaposition can also show how epic and choral performances, though sometimes sharing common semantics, differ from the point of view of their pragmatics.

In the funeral games described in the *Iliad*, there are two specific moments when the horse race strongly resembles the Alcmanic passage. At 23.362–72, in the scene describing both the start and the race, the dust rising beneath the horses is assimilated to a cloud or a storm whirl (365–66); their manes stream along with the blast of the wind (367); the chariots sometimes seem to be lifted up from the ground (369). Finally, as a response to their riders’ calls, the horses are seen as *flying* (372) across the plain. In a number of other Iliadic passages, too, the half-line formulaic epic phrase τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἄεκοντε πετέσθην, describing the rapid movement of chariots belonging to gods or mortals, demonstrates that the imagery of horses flying is an established topos in epic.¹¹ But the expansion of the flight imagery in extended epic descriptions of horse races shows a particular poetic interest in further elaborating this topos. Two specific points in the diction of another detailed description, this time of Diomedes driving his chariot, can further illuminate the Alcmanic lines (23.499–506):¹²

“Ὡς φάτο, Τυδείδης δὲ μάλα σχεδὸν ἦλθε διώκων,
μάστι δ’ αἰὲν ἔλαυνε κατωμαδόν· οἱ δὲ οἱ ἵπποι

11 See, for instance, *Iliad* 5.366, 5.768, 8.45, 10.530, 11.281, 11.519.

12 The translations of the Iliadic passages are basically Lattimore’s with modifications. For brief references to epic parallels of scenes describing horses—not including the ones discussed here—see Page 1951.85. For the Spartan ritual context concerning the female pair known as the Leukippides, see especially Nagy 1990b.346–47.

ὑψός' ἀειρέσθην ῥίμφα πρήσσοντε κέλευθον.
 αἰεὶ δ' ἡνίοχον κονίης ῥαθάμιγγες ἔβαλλον,
 ἄρματα δὲ χρυσῷ πεπυκασμένα κασσιτέρῳ τε
 ἵπποις ὠκυπόδεσσιν ἐπέτρεχον· οὐδέ τι πολλή
 γίγνεται ἐπισσώτρων ἄρματροχίη κατόπισθεν
 ἐν λεπτῇ κονίῃ· τὼ δὲ σπεύδοντε πετέσθην.

Thus he spoke; and Tydeus's son in his rapid course
 came close to them,
 and he continuously lashed his horses down from the
 shoulder with the whip; his horses were lifted high up
 as they made their swift passage;
 bits of dust were unceasingly hitting the charioteer;
 the chariot, covered with gold and tin,
 was rapidly following after the fast running horses; and
 there was not
 much trace left from the running rims of the wheels
 in the thin dust; the two horses, eagerly striving, flew.

Strikingly, the verb ἀείρεσθαι (501), depicting the dynamic uplifting of Diomedes' horses, is the very verb that Alcman uses (ἄνηρομέναι, 63) to capture Hagesichora's and Agido's taking-off as they are assimilated to two race horses. Furthermore, in the following verses, Diomedes' two horses are explicitly seen as flying (506), just as, in their rapid course, Hagesichora and Agido are visualized as two flying doves.

Although a poet composing in seventh-century Sparta did not necessarily know the Iliadic poem in the form transmitted to us, the Iliadic material is illuminating because it certainly reflects a traditional stock of diction and imagery common among poets of the archaic era. I suggest that Alcman's chain of metaphors in lines 58–63 is based on traditional metaphoric imagery, familiar to both his choruses and his audience. The Iliadic text shows that the comparison of horses to birds is a fixed topos; Alcman applies this topos to the needs of his own composition. Thus what is generic in the epic composition becomes specific in his choral piece: the two race horses are not just described as flying but are specifically seen as flying *doves*. The aesthetic and ritual connotations of depicting women as doves have already been analyzed by others (Lawler 1941/42.351–61, Calame 1977.II.75–77). It is worth adding, however, that the poet of the *Partheneion* exploits these connotations in order to implicitly evoke the association of

doves with the Pleiades, members of the star cluster. Yet instead of explicitly developing this expected connotation, he catasterizes the two flying horses-doves in a different way. The Pleiades would be familiar to his audience but inappropriate for his intended ἑταῖρος of the two women, since the stars of this constellation are not only numerous but also notoriously dim. Therefore, he quite miraculously transforms the light, airy, and spectacular running of the two women next to each other into the rising of the brightest star in the heavens: Sirius.¹³

We will come back to the logic of marvel that reaches its peak with this poetic catasterism. For now it is important to appreciate the dramatic and optical coherence of the whole scene. The two women running next to each other could first be visualized as race horses (58–59). They appear to be taking off from the ground while perhaps running away from the sight of their spectators, and thus they are seen as two flying doves (60). Finally, the optical impression of their ascent to the skies inspires the poet to assimilate them to the rising Sirius (62–63). In other words, as the object of sight becomes more distant, what the eye perceives becomes increasingly less distinguishable and less clearly outlined until it is just the impression of light that a source—like a star—radiates towards the observer. What awakens sight is not only the visual character of the unceasing waves of metaphors but the nexus of metaphor and deixis

The Iliadic passage supports the idea that the similarity between the rapid movement of the horses and the flight of the birds depends on sight-impression. Significantly, the focus shifts to the audience of Achaeans watching the race at the very moment when the horses are seen as running far away from their spectators. Moreover, the narrator's account of the running horses seems to coincide with the viewpoint of this audience. It is from this perspective that the racing horses are seen as flying (23.448–49):

13 On the depiction of the two women as Sirius and its poetic logic, see Segal 1998, esp. 31–32, whose line of argumentation is a source of inspiration for the reading suggested here. In my reading, however, the constellation of the Pleiades is not prominent. The poetic imagery focuses on the two women as doves. For a detailed discussion of this issue (which also puzzled the ancient scholiasts), further bibliography, as well as brief summaries of different approaches, see Calame 1977.II.72–77. Burnett's 1964.30–33 suggestion that the chorus refers to the Pleiades is based on the claim that the constellation is mentioned despite its lack of splendor and because of its positive association with fertility and sailing. For similar interpretations, see Clay 1991, esp. 61, Robbins 1991.9–10, Clark 1996.160. For the fixed semantic and mythical interrelation between the cluster of the Pleiades and doves in both ancient and modern Greek lore, see Athanassakis 2000.5–14, esp. 12–14.

Ἄργεῖοι δ' ἐν ἁγῶνι καθήμενοι εἰσορόωντο
ἵππους· τοὶ δὲ πέτοντο κονίοντες πεδίοιο.

The Argives, sitting in assembly, were watching
the horses. And the horses flew, raising dust throughout
the plain.

In the *Iliad*, however, the Achaeans' enjoyment of the admirable flight of the horses is part of the narrator's fictional world, while the "real" audience of the Homeric performer follows the narrative only with the eyes of the imagination. Even if the words of an epic performance primarily addressed the live audience's sense of sight, the epic performer himself remains the only actually present and visible person before the "real" audience.¹⁴ No matter how vivid his recitation, the content of his narrative can only be reconstructed as an image in the minds of his audience.

The conditions of Alcman's choral performance fundamentally differ. Because the agents of the chorus's references are actually present, the audience's perception of them, as well as of the metaphors attributed to them, constantly alternates between mere vision and imaginary visualization. Due to the emphasis placed by the first-person speaker on the deictic field, on the here and now of the performance surrounding the utterance, the cluster of metaphors and similes that accompany the deictics has to be interpreted in the three-dimensional space of the performance. Thus the audience is led to constantly look at the present and actual agents of the ritual as *persons in dramatic action*, namely as *πράττοντες* and *δρῶντες*.¹⁵ Hence the statement, "this race horse is Enetic" should be understood as both a metaphor and a stage direction prompting the second-person spectator to look at Agido as if she were enacting this very role. In the *Partheneion*, then, the interaction between metaphor and deixis mobilizes and animates metaphor in such a way that, ultimately, the entire metaphoric system operates on the borderline between a figure of speech and an impersonation. Or, to put it another way, through the chorus's complicated nexus of deixis and metaphor, the ritual agents are depicted as enacting the metaphor's vehicle.¹⁶

14 Cf. the diction used in Plato's *Ion* 535b–c, especially Socrates' use of the term *θεωμένους*.

15 Aristotle *Poetics*, esp. 1448a25–29.

16 On the term "vehicle" in the analysis of metaphor, see Richards 1965, esp. 118–33.

GETTING THE WORLD TO MATCH THE WORDS: VIEWING AS ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ

Through its dense deictic network, the song implies that both the subjects and objects of viewing are actually part of the extra-verbal performance context. Yet there still remains an open question: what is the essential role of the second-person addressee who appears twice (50 and 56) in the part of the poem under discussion? Both times this addressee is summoned to confirm the chorus's description of the dramatic acts and agents by looking at them. The second-person listener, then, seems to be assigned the role of an eyewitness who is supposed to endorse the truth or falsity of the speaker's descriptions. In J. R. Searle's terminology, this would mean that the chorus's speech-acts describing the current dramatic action qualify as representatives, that is, they commit the chorus to the truth of its expressed propositions (Searle 1976.10–11). Yet, as I intend to show, precisely because deictics are always closely related to metaphor, the chorus's speech-acts, although they stress their own representative quality, in fact, belong to a different category.

Another important component of the pragmatics of the performance can further clarify the non-representative quality of the chorus's speech-acts: time deixis. In the surviving text, there exist two signs of time: a) in lines 40–43, Agido is summoning the sun to appear (ὄρω / ἦ ὥτ' ἄλιον, ὄνπερ ἔμιν / Ἀγιδὼ μαρτύρεται / φαίνην); and b) in line 62, the ambrosial night indicates the time of the chorus's ritual action. If both cases are taken as deictically signaling the actual time of the performance, then performance-time must be located before sunrise. As anybody who has experienced a sunrise knows, forms begin to be vaguely perceivable in this transitional moment from complete darkness to half light. Darker masses arise from the depths of the morning twilight, slowly enabling a faint impression of perspective. Paradoxically, then, the chorus is summoning the second-person addressee to witness what it claims is sharply clear and lucidly transparent (see 50 and 56), but what, under these conditions of semi-darkness, must lack both qualities.

Thus the chorus's speech-acts, despite their descriptive surface, are not really descriptive, and this further supports our understanding of the interaction between deixis and metaphor in the *Partheneion*. Another formulation by Searle turns out to match our case: the chorus's speech-acts do not make the words match the world; quite the opposite, they match the world to the words (Searle 1976.3–4 and 10–11). But, if this is true, then

these speech-acts are not really representatives. They clearly qualify as requests, and they belong to the class of pure directives (Searle 1976.11). By their illocutionary force, these directives involve the second person in the peculiar act of looking at something and seeing not *it* but rather through, above, and beyond it.

I therefore suggest that the call for the addressee to be an eyewitness should be understood as a demand for a creative and knowledgeable way of viewing, that is, nothing less than an active participation in the act of θεωρεῖν. By the term θεωρεῖν, I refer to the activity of intentional, intensive, and thus perceptive viewing, ultimately equivalent to the activity of contemplating. Among other contexts where the act of θεωρεῖν applies in classical Greek, that of attending various kinds of performances involving sight-contact with the act performed seems primary.¹⁷ Employing this principal use of the term—obviously relevant to our case, since we are dealing with the way spectators are summoned to look at the performance unfolding before them—I will further trace its application in two Aristotelian passages important for the two major issues raised here. The first passage discusses the function of metaphor, the second the function of mimesis.

In his *Poetics*, Aristotle claims that successful metaphor-making is identical to the act of perceptively viewing (θεωρεῖν) the similar (1459a6–8):

μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυνίας
τε σημείον ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ εἰ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον
θεωρεῖν ἔστιν.

This alone is something that cannot be transmitted by
somebody else and is an indication of natural talent; for

17 Unlike the nouns θεωρία and, especially, θεωρός that, in classical Greek and in the broader context of attending rituals, seem to apply mainly to cultural practices including perceptive viewing outside the boundaries of one's own polis, the verb θεωρεῖν is employed as perceptive viewing in general, activated in a variety of ways. See, for instance, Plato's *Laws* 657d, 772a, *Republic* 327a1–3 in relation to 327b1, *Republic* 606b1, *Lysis* 206e5–9. On the subtle semantic differentiation in the use of the nouns θεωρία/θεωρός, on the one hand, and the verb θεωρεῖν, on the other, see also Nightingale (forthcoming) ch. 1 n. 4. For θεωρία as a cultural practice, see Rutherford 1998.131–35 and, in particular, 2000.133–46, where he also discusses its relation to contemplation. θεωρία as a cultural practice eventually associated with the concept of philosophic contemplation is discussed *in extenso* by Nightingale 2001.23–58 as well as in her forthcoming book on the same topic.

successful metaphor-making is equivalent to the perception of the similar.¹⁸

Although Aristotle does not explicitly use the term θεωρεῖν in his discussion of metaphor in the *Rhetoric*, the concept is implicit in his analysis. What metaphors do, he suggests, is to make people understand and learn (μανθάνειν). This is achieved by the fact that the receiver enters the process of identifying *this* as *that* (ὡς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο).¹⁹ Thus the Aristotelian θεωρεῖν of the *Poetics* seems to be taken up in the *Rhetoric* as a cognitive process, motivated by metaphors, that enables associations and identifications to be made between apparently dissimilar entities. Furthermore, pleasure is clearly the result of this essentially cognitive process.

Interestingly, the analysis of the cognitive aspect of mimesis in the *Poetics*, although aimed at the understanding of dramatic mimesis, focuses on a different art, the art of painting. Insofar as painting involves sight, this discussion is relevant to the central issue discussed in this paper. According to Aristotle, the viewer's response to the art of painting eventually clarifies the function of mimesis in general, including dramatic mimesis (*Poetics* 1448b10–17):²⁰

ἂ γὰρ λυπηρῶς ὀρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα
ἡκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε
μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ
τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἤδιστον
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοιν-
ωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας
ὀρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ
συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος.

18 The translations of the passages from the *Poetics* are mine. On this passage, see McCall 1969.24–56, esp. 39–53, Dupont-Roc and Lallot 1980.363–65, Halliwell 1986.89–92, 1987.162.

19 See Aristotle *Rhetoric* 3.10.1410b10–20. In this Aristotelian passage, the process of identification of *this* with *that* (ὡς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο) is indirectly attributed to metaphor, in opposition to its absence in the realm of similes. On the cognitive aspect of metaphors according to Aristotle, see Laks 1994.283–305, esp. 296–99 and 303–04. A detailed analysis of the various issues raised in this much discussed passage exceeds the aims of the present reading. The same expression ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο is used in the *Rhetoric* 1.11.1371b4–10 in the broader context of cognition through and by mimesis.

20 For musical mimesis as part of an essentially visual system of εἰκόνες, see Plato *Laws* 669a–c.

Of those things we look at with pain, the most accurate images cause us delight when we contemplate them, such as figures of the most base animals or of corpses. The reason for this also is that learning is most pleasant not only for philosophers, but for others likewise—except that they take part in it briefly. It is for this reason that people delight in looking at images, because it happens that, by contemplating, they learn and they infer about what each one is, namely that this person represents that person.

This passage contains two successive formulations regarding the acts of ὁρᾶν and θεωρεῖν. In the first (1448b10–11), the actual, “real” object is assigned to sight (ἃ γὰρ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν), whereas the εἰκὼν of this very object, that is, its painted representation, is related to the act of θεωρεῖν (τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἡκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες). In the second formulation (1448b15–17), ὁρᾶν is the medium through which θεωρεῖν gets accomplished. In both cases, ὁρᾶν and θεωρεῖν are interconnected: the first is the primary activation of the sense of sight, while the second is the conscious process of thoroughly understanding the object seen.²¹ Thus only through the second act, that of θεωρεῖν, does the cognitive aspect of mimesis become possible, by enabling the association and identification of *this* person as *that* person.

In metaphor, then, as in mimesis, it is the complex act of θεωρεῖν that is activated, mainly in the process of identifying *this* as *that*. In the case of mimesis, *this* depicts the representing medium, while *that* the represented one;²² in the case of metaphor, *this* is the vehicle, while *that* is the tenor (Richards 1965, esp. 118–33). In both cases, the spectator or listener is in direct, actual, contact with *this*; *that* is what lies under and beyond the palpable reality of a performance or a figure of speech. In other words, *that* is subject to the efficiency of the receiver's response and, while actually absent, has to be cognitively recalled. Yet *this*, although actually present, is, in fact, unfamiliar. The process of learning through the act of θεωρεῖν

21 On this distinction, see, for instance, Belfiore 1992.66–70, esp. 67.

22 On this interpretation of the Aristotelian *this* and *that*, see Nagy's illuminating approach in Nagy 1990b.44; also Nagy 1989.47–48. See also Sifakis' 1986 analysis, esp. 217–18 and Dupont-Roc and Lallot 1980.164–65. For an extensive analysis of these and other relevant Aristotelian passages, see Halliwell 2002.177–93.

derives from the identification of the unfamiliar *this* to the familiar *that*, which has to be eventually evoked.

Aristotle's choice of the terms *this* and *that*, deictics par excellence, allows us to use his formulation in order to read Alcman's *Partheneion* as an initiation into the art of creatively seeing, that is, the art of θεωρεῖν. While the process in Alcman will turn out to be the inverse of the one outlined by Aristotle, both archaic poet and classical philosopher rely on the way in which viewers construct equivalences between a *this* and a *that*.

For instance, in both the chorus's deictic language and in Aristotle's terminology, Hagesichora can be described as *this*—the real woman present in front of the spectators. In Alcman's poem, however, Hagesichora signifies, or represents, *herself*, the real leader of the actual chorus, a role that even her name within this performance declares.²³ The identification of visible woman and visible function is asserted when the chorus says Ἀγησιχόρα μὲν αὐτὰ, thus pointing out both the woman and her identity as a choregos, the latter, by definition, a role made possible and meaningful only through actual performance.

What ensues is more intriguing. Due to her multiple metamorphoses through metaphor, the emphatically present, demonstrable, and familiar Hagesichora becomes at the same time defamiliarized as somehow absent and miraculous. In this connection, it is worth noticing that some of the metaphors describing the two agents persistently defamiliarize the *hic* of the performance, of which Hagesichora and Agido are a substantial part, by leading the audience's minds towards a distant and unfamiliar *illic*. Not accidentally, for the Spartan audience all three adjectives attributed to the horses mentioned by the chorus are place names of exotic origin: Enetic, Ibenian, Colaxaeon. Thus both agents are momentarily turned not just into running horses but into exquisite and legendary creatures.²⁴

Through the transformative power of the chorus's speech, then, these agents can be seen in terms of the Aristotelian *this* and *that*. Yet whereas in Aristotle *this* is a present, unfamiliar object ultimately understood and appreciated by means of its association with an absent yet familiar

23 On this see Calame 1977.46–47, Nagy 1990b.347–48. See also note 25.

24 On the origin, reputation, and exceptional competence of Colaxaeon and Enetic horses, see the scrupulous analysis by Devereux 1965.176–84 and 1966.129–34. It is worth noticing that, in this poem, all place names seem to have a defamiliarizing effect in relation to the familiar *hic*. For instance, see the reference to the river Xanthus (v. 100) in the final depiction of the singing swan as a metaphor for Hagesichora's singing voice.

that, in Alcman the opposite occurs. Each time the chorus uses an indexical expression, they focus on the present, the *familiar* world of *this*; each time they employ a metaphor, they refer to an alternative, imaginary, unattainable, and thus *unfamiliar* world of *that*. In this way, the familiar *this* has to be gradually readjusted in our sight, emerging as a plurality of unfamiliar *thats*.²⁵ Through such rapid shifting from *this* to *that* and vice versa, the second person, although ostensibly summoned to perform the act of ὀρᾶν (50), is intellectually drawn into an intense activity of θεωρεῖν. The chorus, as initiated spectators, mediates between the two agents and the audience in order to invite the latter into a world that can be seen, understood, and and enjoyed only through their own singing words.

ΩΠΕΡ ΑΙΤΙΣ ΣΤΑΣΕΙΕΝ: THE DREAMING CHOREOGRAPHER, HIS DREAMING CHORUS

Through the chorus's guidance and educated vision, the most familiar entities are seen to be the most magnificent wonders. This peculiar vision of sublimity enables the ritual agents, even in the dark, to appear radiant as the sun, their racing as supreme as that of the most exotic horses, their dove-like flight like the rising of the brightest star of heavens. Within this logic of marvel and transgression, the chorus's deictic insistence can be understood and appreciated. Moreover, now we can understand why, in the lines that follow (64–77), the chorus, in its self-description, represents its own appearance as conspicuously inferior to that of the ritual agents. Not accidentally, all the qualities attributed by the chorus to its own, named, members relate to sight: the abundance of purple (64–65), the bracelet of solid gold (66–67), the luxurious headband from Lydia (67–68), Nanno's hair (70). Yet all these elaborate elements, presumably referring to the chorus's look and costumes, lack the most important quality: the sublimity of metaphor. Compared to Hagesichora's and Agido's metamorphoses through metaphor, this intentionally literal description sounds inadequate and deficient.²⁶

Perhaps we can now reread lines 45–49 of the *Partheneion*: "For she (i.e., Hagesichora) looks pre-eminent, just as if somebody were to set a

25 It is precisely this process of constant transformation of *this* into a plurality of *thats* that renders the ultimate correspondence between the ritual agents and the venerated goddess Orthria or Aotis not one of direct identification but one of indirect and diffused evocation.

26 A thorough analysis of 64–77, including its interesting deictic aspect, would require a separate paper. On the priamel structure, see, for instance, Race 1982.54–55.

horse among grazing herds, a sturdy, thunderous-hoofed prize winner, one of those seen in winged dreams.”²⁷ Claude Calame has clearly shown how the metaphoric imagery of these lines reflects the relations unifying the ἀγέλη of adolescents with their choregos by means of erotic as well as pedagogical bonds. However, the specific diction of these lines deserves emphasis. In this metaphoric imagery, the chorus *does not* say: “Hagesichora looks pre-eminent, like a horse among grazing herds . . .”²⁸ What they *do* say is: “Hagesichora looks pre-eminent, just as *if somebody were to set* (τὼς ὡπερ αἴτις στάσειεν) among the herds a horse . . .” In the broader frame of a performance where all the participants are individually named, who would this hypothetical and anonymous “someone” be? Who is the person imagined as placing Hagesichora among the herds *like* a horse of dreams?

The answer to this question arises from the verb attached to this hypothetical person: στάσειεν (v. 47). When horses are the object of the verb ἵστημι, as in the case under discussion, the verb denotes that their rider has brought them to a standstill when he stops his chariot. Ordinarily, then, this coming to rest is completed by the feeding and watering of the horses.²⁹ Alcman’s use of the verb στάσειεν could initially be understood within this semantic context, which is supported by the presence of the phrase ἐν βοτοῖς (47) that refers to the rest of the grazing animals, in whose midst the simile’s pre-eminent horse would be hypothetically placed. Yet despite the stillness implied by the verb ἵστημι in imagery about horses, in this specific case the ensuing epithets strongly evoke associations of movement: παγόν, ἀεθλοφόρον, καναχάποδα.³⁰ All three qualities are meant to establish the horse’s pre-eminence in running. Thus the entire simile that apparently begins with the visualization of rest, eventually encourages an envisioning of vigorous movement.

27 In the translation of τῶν ὑποπετριδίων ὀνείρων as winged dreams—thus ὑποπετριδίων by metathesis for ὑποπετριδίων—I am following Page 1951.87. The alternative interpretation “rock-sheltered dreams” would not change the essential meaning of these lines.

28 In the attribution of αὐτα (v. 45) to Hagesichora, I am following Calame 1977.II.47–49; in other readings, it is attributed to Agido. On this still disputed issue, see an older but still illuminating table of different approaches in Calame 1977.II.177. The questions raised in our reading have an autonomous importance, valid in either case.

29 See, for instance, *Iliad* 5.368, 24.350.

30 For παγόν and ἀεθλοφόρον together, see *Iliad* 9.124 and 9.266. In this context, παγός, although related etymologically to the verb πῆγνυμι, is unlikely to be associated with stillness; it probably underlines the firm and robust appearance of the horse. Interestingly, in the Homeric poems, παγός is also attributed to the waves, moving entities par excellence: *Odyssey* 5.388, 23.235.

Therefore, I suggest that, within the broader imagery and diction of these lines, the verb *στάσειεν* acquires a multidimensional dynamic. In the context of choral performances, the verb *ἵστημι* is strongly marked and signifies the setting-up of the chorus.³¹ Moreover, this choral reference is explicitly activated in the extant part of the *Partheneion* by the use of the word *χοροστάτις* (v. 84), probably referring to the leader of the chorus. In the context of a choral composition where the combination of singing and dancing becomes the very theme of the chorus's song, the semantics of *στάσειεν* are most likely colored by the verb's choral implications. Thus, on the level of the simile, the anonymous *τις* (46) could initially be identified as a hypothetical rider bringing his superb horse to a standstill among grazing herds. But as the nexus of metaphors blurs with the performance's self-referential discourse, the verb *στάσειεν*—along with the undefined *τις* as its subject—surpasses the limits of its initial use and eventually refers to the conception and visualization of the performance's *mise en scène*. It should then be associated with the activity of the *chorodidaskalos*, the person who sets up and coordinates the song and dance action.

I suggest, then, that the person behind this anonymous but brilliantly arranged formulation (*τὼς ὥπερ αἰτίς / ἐν βοτοῖς στάσειεν ἵππον*, 46–47), is probably the person who stages the *Partheneion*, that is Alcman himself. He is the one who visualized the chorus leader as a sturdy, thunderous-hoofed prize winner, and the nearly imperceptible movement of grazing herds as perhaps resembling the slow movement of the singing chorus.³²

31 The phrase *χορὸν ἵστημι* is used throughout antiquity and signifies the setting up of the choral performance. Two of the earliest extant uses of the expression occur in Pindar's *Paians* 52b.99 and Bacchylides' *Epinicians* 11.112. For the verb *ἵστημι* as a marked verb denoting the setting up of the chorus, see Calame 1977.I.88–89, 94, Nagy 1990b.361–62.

32 Both Page 1951.85–86 and Calame 1977.II.67–70, esp. 68, refer to *Iliad* 2.480–83, where Agamemnon's bearing is described as surpassing the Achaeans the way a bull appears pre-eminent among gathered cows (*ὁ γὰρ τε βόεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀγρομένησι*, 481). Interestingly, in both the Homeric text and the Alcmanic *Partheneion*, the indisputable superiority in appearance is conceived of as the result of an intervention. In the former, Zeus makes Agamemnon surpass the other Achaeans; in the latter, it is the person implied behind the undefined and hypothetical *τις*. The fact that, in both passages, somebody from outside the scene of action is staging the scene described makes it even more likely that, in the case of the *Partheneion*, the poet hints at his own role as *chorodidaskalos*. Moreover, it is interesting that the verb used for the setting of the scene in the *Partheneion* is *στάσειεν* (v. 47), a marked verb within the frame of choral language, whereas the verb used in the Homeric text is *θῆκε* (v. 482), a verb perhaps more appropriate for craft activity, as for example, in the description of Achilles' shield (*Il.* 18.541, 550, 561).

Why is this pre-eminent race horse a horse *of dreams*, however? My answer is that Alcman, as the *chorodidaskalos* of the *Partheneion*, is also its original spectator: he was the first who dreamt it up and visualized it. Unlike all the deictic signs emphatically and persistently pointing towards the protagonists of his choral oeuvre, he, the *chorodidaskalos*, is modestly but inventively alluding to his performance. The horse—like the nocturnal performance itself—is his own dream-piece, now emerging just before dawn as a waking dream in the eyes of his spectators.

If our reading of lines 36–72 is persuasive, then the prominent and multifaceted function of deixis and sight in these problematic lines reveals an important aspect of Alcman's dramatic awareness. The dreaming *chorodidaskalos* is the one who teaches his chorus how to lift simple sight up to the level of vision and dreaming; in their turn, his educated dreamers, the young maidens, by describing their dream-like performance through deixis, lure the audience into their own visionary world. If this is true, then Nietzsche's insight in his *Birth of Tragedy* about the role of the chorus in Greek drama proves to be strikingly accurate in the case of Alcman's lyric drama: "Now we are ready to understand Schlegel's formulation in a deeper sense. The chorus is the 'ideal spectator' insofar as it is the only beholder, the beholder of the visionary world of the scene."³³ Even if no actual stage or orchestra existed as established architectural elements at Alcman's performances, we can be sure that this *chorodidaskalos* knew the art of turning ritual into theater in its most original sense: a place for seeing.

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33 In Kaufmann's translation, Nietzsche 1967.62.